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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE FATE OF STRICT
LIABILITY UNDER THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
BY
KALYANI ROBBINS*
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) contains a very broad ban
on harming migratory birds, as well as a strict liability standard for
misdemeanor violations. Without further limitation, the MBTA would
theoretically apply to countless ordinary life activities, such as driving a
car or having windows on one's home. Naturally, there are due process
concerns with such a scenario, so Congress expressly left it to the
Department of the Interior to draft more detailed implementing
regulations Unfortunately, the existing regulations fail to adequately
address the potential overbreadth of the MBTA 's misdemeanor
application, forcing the courts to do so on an ad hoc basis. Such
individualized legal analyses create the risk of developing bad law as a
result of less-than-ideal test cases. This is exactly what took place in
United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010), the
only appellate case dealing with the MBTA 's strict liability standard in
the context of industrial harms-the current trend for enforcement-in
several decades. In that case, the Tenth Circuit applied a 'knew or
should have known" standard to an industrial actor causing bird
deaths, holding that criminal liability only attaches after the United
States Fsh and Wildlife Service has directly notified the defendant in
writing of the danger his equipment presents to birds. This is a terrible
case, as it completely writes the strict liability standard out of the
* Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law. Thanks go to Dan RohIf for
inviting me to write this symposium piece, to the faculties at the University of San Francisco
School of Law and the University of Akron School of Law for their helpful input during draft
workshops, and to the amazing bird advocates at the symposium presentation whose thoughtful
questions brought a more practical perspective to the issues in this Article.
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statute. This Article argues that regulations-or even a written
enforcement policy-that create prosecutorial limitations to avoid
violating due process will prevent courts from struggling to cope with
the MBTA 's theoretically broad reach, which can result in bad law. It
sorts through the historical development of strict liability, especially in
the public welfare offense context, and proposes that those engaged in
activities where regulation should be foreseen-such as operating oil
rigs, as in Apollo Energies-should be held to a higher standard than
others. This is in line with the Supreme Court case la wjustifying strict
liability in the face of due process challenges. Ultimately, the Article
concludes that such across-the-board line drawing for the MBTA's
strict liabibty provisions would have prevented the Tenth Circuit from
deciding Apollo Energies as it did.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hemisphere solidarity is new among statesmen, but not among the feathered
navies of the sky.-Aldo Leopold'
I realized that if I had to choose, I would rather have birds than airplanes.
-Charles A. Lindbergh
Birds should be saved because of utilitarian reasons; and, moreover, they
should be saved because of reasons unconnected with any return in dollars
and cents. . . . [T]o lose the chance to see frigate-birds soaring in circles
above the storm, or a file of pelicans winging their way homeward across the
crimson afterglow of the sunset, or a myriad terns flashing in the bright light of
midday as they hover in a shifting maze above the beach-why, the loss is
1 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY AIMIANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 35 (1949).
2 Alden Whitman, Lindbergh Traveling Widely as Conservationist N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
1969, at 1, 26 (quoting Lindbergh).
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like the loss of a gallery of the masterpieces of the artists of old time.
-Theodore Roosevelt3
There is a constant tension in all areas of wildlife regulation. On the one
hand is the somewhat understandable prioritization of a modern lifestyle
and comforts over the protection of creatures we barely understand. On the
other hand we have our highly disciplined legislative choices made long ago,
at a time when the political climate and economic needs were somewhat
different than they are today. Why should a little fish nobody previously
knew existed halt completion of a major dam project on which millions of
dollars have already been spent?' Who really cares about some irritating fly
when there are so many people crammed into southern California and
desperate for more living space?' Thankfully, with the development of the
relatively new scientific field of conservation biology, we are beginning to
understand the importance of keeping every cog in the wheel, but because
not everyone is onboard, strict protective laws remain essential.
The focus of this symposium is on migratory birds in particular, so the
policy question is narrower. To what lengths must we go to avoid harming
migratory birds, and how much must be sacrificed for each handful of bird
deaths prevented? Further, and of particular relevance to this Article: How
much research must we do, individually and proactively, on the potential
risks we create for migratory birds? How much can we be expected to
anticipate? Are some of us burdened with a greater responsibility than
others to learn about migratory birds and their habits? My answer, which
this Article endeavors to support, is that those who present a greater risk
than that posed by the average member of the public should be held to a
higher duty When it comes to commercial activity, regulation is to be
expected. The strict liability offenses found in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA)6 should be enforced with the purest form of strict liability when
dealing with industrial harms.
Part II of this Article will establish, as a preliminary matter, that there is
no remaining question that the misdemeanor offenses in the MBTA are to be
enforced with strict liability. Part III will review strict liability itself in an
effort to determine how it is to be applied, both as a policy matter and in
preserving due process. This Part will follow the progression of the standard
from its roots into the modem realm of environmental offenses, an area in
which it arguably fits best. Part IV focuses on a particularly disconcerting
3 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, A BOOK-LOVER'S HOLIDAYS IN THE OPEN 316-17 (1916).
4 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159, 171-73 (1978) (prohibiting completion of
a dam that would have eradicated the snail darter, an endangered species, or destroyed its
critical habitat).
5 See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(affirming the lower court's application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. H§ 1531-1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly
(Rhaphiomidas termmatusabdominais); section 9(a)(1) is at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006)).
6 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Strict liability is addressed in 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a) (2006).
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recent case out of the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.'
The criticism contained in the same Part is due both because the case
creates bad law and because it has arguably taken over the position as the
definitive authority on the application of the MBTA's strict liability standard.
Finally, what we can glean from the state of case law in this area is that we
absolutely must sort through the possible applications of the statute and
derive a sensible and relatively uniform system to make it work as strongly
as possible without offending due process. Part V proposes such a plan.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED FOR MBTA MISDEMEANORS
While the initial matter of establishing that the MBTA imposes strict
liability for its misdemeanor offerises is an important one, it is also one that
can be achieved quickly. There is little controversy on this issue. The MBTA
began as a purely strict liability statute, but was later amended to add a
mens rea requirement for its felony provisions." It now distinguishes
between misdemeanors and felonies in its penalty provisions as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association,
partnership, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said
conventions or of this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to comply with
any regulation made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000
or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly-
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell,
offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both."
In the 1986 amendments requiring mens rea for felony violations,
Congress added the above-cited "knowingly" to section 707(b)"o after a case
found the felony provisions in the MBTA unconstitutional," even though
strict liability felonies had been upheld in other contexts." In response to
remaining concerns about strict liability in certain special circumstances,
Congress further amended the MBTA to make it unlawful to hunt over baited
7 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
8 Id. at 686.
9 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)-(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
10 Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, § 501, 100 Stat. 3582,
3590 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006)) (providing that the knowledge requirement only
goes to the fact that actions constitute sale, barter, or offer to sell migratory birds).
11 United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1122 (6th Cir. 1985).
12 See, eg, United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 433-36 (3d Cir. 1986).
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fields where "the person knows or reasonably should know that" he or she is
hunting over baited fields."
Throughout the several occasions that Congress amended the mens rea
requirements under the MBTA, and in spite of the clear trend of such
amendments chipping away at strict liability, it repeatedly left general
misdemeanor violations alone. When adding the term "knowingly" to section
707(b), Congress left section 707(a) without it.4 This was no accident, as the
legislative history of the amendment makes clear: "Nothing in this
amendment is intended to alter the 'strict liability' standard for misdemeanor
prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in
many Federal court decisions." The vast majority of courts addressing the
issue have upheld strict liability as the correct standard for MBTA
misdemeanors.'6 What is less consistent, however, is how to apply this
standard. That, of course, is the main concern of this Article.
III. HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY
Before we can take a meaningful look at the methods courts are using
in applying the strict liability standard under the MBTA, it is necessary to
understand strict liability in general. It is my position that strict liability has
recently been applied differently in the MBTA context-erroneously-so I
must begin with a proper investigation into that from which it differs.
A. Mens Rea
A ctus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea."
The association between criminal liability and a guilty mind goes back
many centuries-at least to the thirteenth century and possibly several
earlier than that." Blackstone commented that "to constitute a crime against
human laws, there must be, first, a vi[c]ious will."9 Some would even say
that the mental element has been relevant in criminal law from "time
13 Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 102, 112 Stat. 2956, 2956
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1) (2006)).
14 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)-(b) (2006).
15 S. REP. No. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128.
16 See, ag, United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 614-16 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.
1994); Engler, 806 F.2d at 431; United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. FMC Corp., 572
F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966). Cf
United States v. Wood, 437 F.2d 91, 92 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (affirming the finding that "if
scienter was an element, the flight of appellants supplied a basis for such an inference").
17 Bruce R. Bryan, The Battle Between Mens Rea and the Publc Welfare: United States v.
Laughlin Finds a Addle Ground, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 157, 159 n.11 (1995) ("[A]n act does not
make a person guilty unless his mind is guilty{].").
18 See Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: The Rise and Fal of Strict Cniminal
Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 338 n.4 (1989).
19 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (reprt. 1966).
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immemorial."2 0 That said, many historians do not believe that there was
always a mental element to criminal laws, but rather hold that it was the
church that injected this form of morality into what had previously been
merely about causing harm to society, arguing that the church's addition was
in part based on a theory of vengeance.2 ' But from a utilitarian standpoint,
which arguably is the societally stronger basis for policy, vengeance is of
only little value, and only to the few who have directly suffered at the
criminal's hands.
What we need most, in order to be capable of living among so many
millions of others who are not necessarily concerned with our best interests,
is deterrence. Of course, there is a place for mens rea in this deterrent ideal.
It is easiest to deter that which is done intentionally.22 When an individual
has a criminal plan or purpose, and assuming he is among those who are
capable of weighing the costs and benefits of proceeding with their evil
plans, it is quite easy for him to combine the variables of punishment and
likelihood of capture to weigh against the achievement of the wrongful
goal." This cost benefit analysis is at the heart of the deterrent goal of
criminal law, and is most accessible to those who know that what they are
about to do is wrong.
That said, and while we cannot have proper vengeance without mens
rea, there will be times when certain, otherwise innocent, behaviors will
need to be regulated, both to achieve uniformity where needed and to
reduce the risks the behaviors may create. The question is: can deterrence
be accomplished without mens rea? It is my position that it can, that some
choices and involvements come with heightened duties of care, and that
ignorance of the risks created is itself a behavior that can be deterred.
Ignorance is the antithesis of mens rea, but where one is in a special position
to prevent harm, ignorance of that harm can indeed be deterred. Sometimes
harms ignorantly caused can be resolved in tort, and such has been the
argument that criminal punishment should be reserved in this manner for
the morally blameworthy." There are nonetheless certain remaining
circumstances that require regulation and do not fit neatly into the tort
system," suggesting that the rule of mens rea needs to admit
some exceptions.
20 Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law WithoutIt: Rationale and the West Virginia
Rule, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 34, 34-35 (1955).
21 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 975 (1932).
22 See Philip J. Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the
Second Decade, in2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211, 216-18 (1980).
23 Id. at 216.
24 See id. at 216-17.
25 See Sayre, supra note 21, at 1003-04.
26 See id
584 [Vol. 42:579
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B Strict Liability Fills Enforcement Gaps Left by Requirement of Mens Rea
Many criminal statutes do not specify a mens rea element, but courts
will presume it is there where the statute codifies a common law offense, as
mens rea was so deeply engrained in the common law." However, around
the middle of the nineteenth century a new sort of criminal law began to
develop, one which sought to regulate certain behaviors that may place the
public welfare at risk, and to do so without regard to fault.! This "strict
liability" has historically applied to those engaged in a dangerous activity
that places them in a position of responsibility to the public, such as
supplying goods or handling highly dangerous materials.' Such offenses are
described as "public welfare" offenses, and the U.S. Supreme Court has
suggested that so-described offenses are generally the only kind that can be
criminalized without requiring proof of mens rea."
Many scholars have battled strenuously against this trend, arguing that
the criminalization of "morally neutral" actions "dilute[s] the value of the
criminal sanction and diminish[es] its meaning."' They suggest that
proponents of strict liability for public welfare offenses are making a deal
with the devil, trading the moral justification for criminal punishment for the
convenience of deterring harmful acts that do not stem from a guilty
conscience." There is one glaring fallacy in this argument: where there can
be deterrence, there is by definition some matter of choice, and therefore
the existence of fault, even if too subliminal to meet a mens rea standard.
Where there is choice there is fault, and without choice there is no potential
for deterrence.n Just as traditional crimes come with a spectrum of mens rea
levels-for instance, purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently, as we
27 See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) ("[Tihe general rule at common
law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime,
and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not
in terms include it.. ."); Colin Manchester, The Origins of Strict Criminal Liability, 6 ANGLO-AM.
L. REV. 277, 277 (1977).
28 Manchester, supra note 27, at 277-83 (tracing the emergence of strict liability "regulatory
offenses" to the rise of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-1800s).
29 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607-09 (1994).
30 Id. at 616-19.
31 See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag offa Mattress: Overcriminalization
and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535 (1997) (citing the
thread of scholarly criticism addressing criminalization of regulatory offenses).
32 See, e.g, Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at
72, 77 ("[C]riminal law is increasingly used against purely regulatory offenses, such as those
involving the activities permitted in public parks, the maintenance procedures at warehouses,
and the foodstuffs that may be imported into a state. The move is understandable: reformers
seek to enlist the moral force implicit in criminal conviction for the sake of deterrence-a force
that civil liability does not carry. But the use of criminal conviction in the absence of serious
criminal harm that deserves moral condemnation weakens that very force. As the label
'criminal' is increasingly applied to minor violations of a merely civil nature, criminal liability
will increasingly become indistinct from civil and will lose its particular stigma.").
33 See Green, supra note 31, at 1579, 1591-92 (noting that the choice to act in violation of
any law may have "significant moral content," indicating that mere illegality regardless of mens
rea may have a deterrent effect).
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see in the Model Penal Code"'-so too does seemingly unintended harm, that
which falls below the threshold for negligence. The choices at issue merely
come earlier in the strict liability context.
We all make risk-preventative choices every day for ourselves and our
families: child proofing our home when it houses a toddler, wearing a
seatbelt though we have never been in an accident, and locking our front
door when we know of no person ever having tried to open it uninvited.
Most such choices are not required of us, but when our activities interplay
with the outside world, when we are in a position to protect others from
risk, we cannot always be counted on to be as naturally protective as we are
of ourselves and our families. This is where strict liability public welfare
offenses can step in to require us to proactively prevent harm-even harm
that we are not aware is taling place-because we alone are in a position to
prevent it. It is this special role of sole capability and responsibility, and not
mens rea, which forms the justification for criminal sanctions when the
prohibited and preventable harm takes place.
C Strict Liability Is Not Another Name for Negligence
The modem distillation of mens rea options tends to focus on the
concepts of purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.5 While there
are other mens rea terms in use, these are the broad concepts they
represent. Negligence is the lowest standard, and generally requires that a
defendant fail to live up to a duty of which he should have been aware but
was not. When we call people negligent we are saying that they should have
been more careful, more conscious, more proactive and on top of those
things over which they have exercised some control, but we are not calling
them consciously careless, as that would move toward the standard for
recklessness.37 Ultimately, negligence is a very low standard, and one that
can easily apply to morally innocent people.
. Strict liability, on the other hand, is the complete absence of any mens
rea requirement at all.& Because it is not negligence, it is not necessary to
consider what a reasonable person would have done, or known about." We
need not label the defendant careless or unconcerned. It is guilt without
moral fault.40 It is the person who drives over the speed limit not realizing
that their speedometer was off by ten miles per hour, which person may well
have been the most conservative, rule-following driver you have ever met. It
is a rule the legislature has decided is essential that everyone follow
universally and without fail, and often one in which there is difficulty in
34 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Official Draft 1985).
35 See id.
36 Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
37 DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 188 (2d
ed. 2010).
38 Id. at 204.
39 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft 1985) (negligence standard).
40 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009)
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proving a mental state.4 1 It is a kind of harm society has determined that you
simply cannot cause, no matter how innocently. It is called "strict" for
good reason.
Because strict liability applies regardless of knowledge, foreseeability
of the harm itself 41 is not an appropriate concern, as that is a concept
wedded to the notion of a guilty mind. Of course, some act, or omission
where there was a duty to act, must still be present, as without an actus reus
there would be nothing left of a crime. Wholly passive behavior cannot be
criminalized.41 Strict liability is generally the approach taken when a
legislature wants to hold those who take on a special responsibility to a high
standard of care, one that demands the search for information about hazards
that goes beyond that which they already knew or even should have known."
It is not another term for negligence, but rather the complete absence of any
mens rea at all: "Indeed, the premise of strict liability is that the defendant is
held guilty no matter how careful and morally innocent he or she, or one for
whose acts he or she is responsible, has been.",5
The landmark case defining strict criminal liability is United States v.
Balint.4 In that case the defendant was charged with selling narcotic drugs
without a written order, in violation of the Narcotic Act of 1914.4' Balint
demurred to the indictment on the basis that it did not allege that he knew
the drug he sold was a narcotic drug, and the district court quashed the
indictment for this reason.4 ' The Supreme Court held that there was no
knowledge requirement in the statute, as well as no due process violation for
its absence, and revived the indictment.4 ' The Court pointed out that this
trend of criminal statutes without mens rea was necessary to address
matters in which enforcement may be impeded by such a requirement.o In
the pursuit of social betterment, those who cause proscribed harm may be
punished in spite of their complete ignorance as to the facts that caused the
harm." The Balint Court accepted the fact that sometimes innocent parties
41 CRUMP ET AL., supra note 37, at 206.
42 As opposed to the actor's general exposure to regulation based upon her involvement and
authority. See, eg, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1943) (stating that
regardless of an actor's consciousness of wrongdoing, Congress has placed the burden of
determining risk on those actors-such as the president of a company-who have an
opportunity to inform themselves, rather than place the risk on the helpless public).
43 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1957).
44 See Singer, supra note 18, at 389.
45 Id. at 356.
46 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
47 Id. at 251; Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C
§§ 1040-1054 (1934)).
48 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
49 Id at 252, 254.
50 Id. at 251-52.
51 Id. at 252 (noting that the Court in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Ainnesota "held that in the
prohibition or punishment of particular acts, the State may in the maintenance of a public
policy provide 'that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to
plead in defense good faith or ignorance'" (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S.
57, 69-70 (1910))).
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would be convicted, noting that Congress had weighed that concern against
the harm to be avoided by the statute, factoring in the difficulty involved in
proving knowledge under the relevant circumstances.
The classic example used to teach the concept of strict criminal liability
is statutory rape, which is virtually always a strict liability offense." Where,
for instance, a state legislature has set the age of consent for sexual
intercourse at sixteen, if a defendant of sufficient age under the statute has
sex with a fifteen-year-old, he is guilty of the offense regardless of his
knowledge of her age." He is guilty in spite of a reasonable belief that she
was eighteen. Such belief may be based on her own statements, her
appearance, even her enrollment in college-it would not matter how great
the reasons for the belief-he is still guilty of the offense." He is given the
duty to ascertain without fail that the person with whom he engages in
sexual activity is old enough to consent to that activity.a This is because the
protection of youthful innocence has outweighed, as a policy matter, his
entitlement to act in ignorance. The most famous case supporting this long
tradition is Regina v. Prince," from the nineteenth century. This area of strict
criminal liability likely set the stage for the proliferation of such offenses
throughout the twentieth century.
Another classic case demonstrating just how far courts are willing to go
in punishing without mens rea is State v. Lindberg" The banking statute at
issue in that case provided that "[e]very director and officer of any bank ...
who shall borrow ... any of its funds in an excessive amount ... shall ... be
guilty of a felony.""9 The defendant argued that he could not be charged with
the offense because not only did he not know the money came from his
bank, but he had even been assured by the bank official processing the loan
that the money came from a different bank.w However, the court held that
the reasonableness of the defendant's mistake was not a defense because
the statute did not require proof of mens rea." The act of borrowing money
52 Id at 254.
5 See Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Informadon as to Victim ' Age as
Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R. 5TH 499, 508 (1997).
54 See, eg, MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (West 2011); see also Campbell, supra note 53, at 510-
13 (listing states that follow the strict liability rule).
55 See, e.g., Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 798-99, 803-04 (Md. 1993) (affirming the
exclusion of evidence that a mentally retarded man had a reasonable belief that the age
difference between the victim and himself was within the statutory limit).
56 See, e.g., id at 802-05 (noting that although two-fifths of the states allow a defense of
reasonable mistake as to the victim's age, the statutes of the majority of states impose strict
liability in cases of statutory rape, placing the risk of mistake as to the victim's age solely on
the defendant).
57 [1875] 13 App. Cas. 138 (H.L.) 144-45 (A.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that a
defendant's bona fide and reasonable belief that a girl is older than 16 is not a defense against
an indictment for unlawfully taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 from her father).
58 215 P. 41 (Wash. 1923).
59 WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3259 (Remington 1932) (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 30.12.060-30.12.070 (2010)).
60 Lindberg, 215 P. at 44-45.
61 Id. at 45, 47.
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that in fact came from his own bank was a violation of the statute without
regard to his lack of knowledge of the key facts making it so. 2
If there is no need for culpability, where does guilt come from in the
context of strict criminal liability? It is sufficient to have authority over the
conditions which led to the proscribed harm." Such responsibility
encourages one to seek out every possible necessity for care, not just those
which he knows about or even should have known about-the latter being
the standard for negligence." This is not to say that it is simply a higher
standard of care, beyond the reasonable to the extraordinary, as this would
still fall within the concept of mens rea."5 Rather, it is entirely irrelevant
whether the defendant should have known, or even should have discovered
with great effort, that the risk was there. It is sufficient that the defendant
had authority over the conditions creating the risk-and ultimately causing
the harm-and that avoidance of the harm was possible .66 While acting with
due care to avoid proscribed harms is not sufficient to defend against a strict
liability charge, it is certainly the sort of behavior such a statute encourages,
thereby going beyond negligence.
D. Strict Liability Does Have Limits
Of course, the leeway to create criminal sanctions without regard to
fault is not unfettered. There are, as there must be, due process limitations
to such a development. In United States v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp. (International Minerals),67 the Supreme Court tied the
concept of strict criminal liability to the involvement in activities one might
expect to be regulated, such as when shipping dangerous substances-as
was at issue in that case" -or selling drugs-as in Baint." The Court noted
that while "[p]encils, dental floss, [and] paper clips may also be regulated,"
doing so would raise serious due process concerns absent a mens rea
requirement.70 It is this concept that forms the foundation of my ultimate
proposals for directing MBTA enforcement.'
In Staples v. United States2 the Court was not directly focused on a due
process violation, but rather construed a firearms regulation as having a
mens rea requirement in spite of its silence on the matter .73 However, the
62 Id
63 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-71 (1975).
6 See, e.g., id. at 672.
65 See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1131-33 (1997) (arguing that strict liability does not entail a duty to use
"extraordinary care").
66 See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 671-72, 674.
67 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
68 Id at 563-65.
69 Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
70 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65.
71 See discussion infra Part V.
72 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
73 Id. at 619.
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Court did so in an apparent attempt to avoid a due process problem4
because the Court focused on two ways of limiting the potential for strict
criminal liability. First, it considered the International Minerals
characterization of strict liability regulatory or public welfare offenses as
being those in which the defendant is engaged in some sort of potentially
harmful or injurious activity." Although the statute at issue in Staples
regulated automatic weapons, the Court held-but with only five justices
agreeing on this point-that because gun ownership is so extremely
common, an automatic weapon could not qualify as a dangerous item one
might expect to .be regulated. 6 This position is, not surprisingly, highly
controversial." The second basis for the Court's requirement of mens rea
added a limitation on the extent of punishment that may be available under a
strict liability statute." While not ruling out strict liability for felonies-
Balint involved a felony with imprisonment of up to five years and was not
overruled in Staples-the Court held that the ten-year imprisonment
potential upon conviction under the National Firearms Act was too severe a
punishment for those convicted without proof of mens rea-treating this as
an indication of legislative intent to require mens rea, rather than as a due
process violation, so the statute was not invalidated.80
These limiting cases are about determining whether strict liability is
permissible, and not how it is applied once it is determined to be the
74 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65 (noting possible due process questions
raised if Congress were to regulate products that are not "dangerous or deleterious" or
"obnoxious waste materials" without requiring a mens rea element); see also Alex Arensberg,
Note, Are Migratory Birds Extending Environmental Crnminal Liability?, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 427,
429-30 (2011) (explaining possible due process consequences of strict criminal liability, but
noting that public welfare offenses do not necessarily need mens rea to satisfy constitutional
due process concerns because regulation of those offenses is foreseeable).
75 Staples, 511 U.S. at 607.
76 Id. at 611-14, 622, 624. In addition to holding that guns are not dangerous enough to
anticipate their regulation, the Court surprisingly suggested that cars could be termed
"dangerous" devices. Id. at 614. While a car is every bit as deadly as an automatic weapon, a car
is not designed for the purpose of causing harm. More to the point, the reason that guns were
deemed not to trigger the expectation of regulation was in large part because they are so
common, though certainly they are far less common than cars. Id. at 613-14 ("Roughly 50
percent of American homes contain at least one firearm of some sort. . . ."); Robin Chase, You
Asked Does Everyone in America Own a Car, AMERICA.Gov ARCHIVE, Mar. 19, 2010,
http://www.america.gov/st/peopleplace-english/2010/March/20100316154329fsyelkaewO.
8109356.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (stating that 95% of households own a car).
7 See, e.g, Staples, 511 U.S. at 624, 631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding guns dangerous
and noting surprise at the Court's likening of guns more to food stamps than to hand grenades);
Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The
EnvironmentalExample, 25 ENvrtL. L. 1165, 1202-03 (1995) (referring to the Court's reasoning as
"a radical departure from prior cases"); Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness
of Notice: Confronting "Apparent Innocence"in the Criminal La w, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 4, 25-
26 (1995) (noting the contextual nature of innocuousness, the differing views of the Justices on
the innocence of guns, and the general controversy regarding the "social significance of
gun ownership").
78 Staples, 511 U.S. at 617-19.
79 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5849 (2006).
8o Staples, 511 U.S. at 615-16, 618-19, 635 n.20.
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standard. Thus, they cease to be relevant once courts have agreed that a
statute does, in fact, apply strict liability. Once it has been determined that
the context is appropriate for strict liability, that the seriousness of
punishment is acceptable, and that strict criminal liability was the intent of
the legislature, all that remains is the case-by-case question of whether the
harm was within the control of the defendant.
E Foreseeability Has Limited Application to Strict Liability
Strict criminal liability is not limited to harms that were foreseeable.
Indeed, it is quite common among scholars, when arguing that a particular
law does not impose strict liability, to use as evidence of this point the fact
that it hinges on foreseeability of the relevant harm.8 ' This foreseeability
requirement before imposing guilt is what distinguishes the given law from
those imposing strict criminal liability. When we call something foreseeable,
we are saying that it could or should have been foreseen, which is logically
indistinguishable from the "should have known" standard, which is the test
for negligence." Instead, "the premise of strict liability is that the defendant
is held guilty no matter how careful and morally innocent he or she ... has
been.""
Some courts have erroneously taken foreseeability into account in the
context of strict liability by couching it in terms of proximate causation."
While lack of proximate causation can indeed be a defense to strict liability,
this is so only to the extent that it negates the actus reus."' It is a fallacy to
view it as an aspect of the mens rea, such that foreseeability considerations
are broadly permissible, as there is no mens rea in strict liability crimes. The
manner in which lack of foreseeability can eliminate proximate causation
and aid in a criminal defendant's case is where there is some superseding
81 See, e.g, Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of hndividual Responsibility Under the
Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 109, 116 (2007) (noting that the
fallibility of determining foreseeability can lead to a circumstance of strict liability); Peter J.
Saghir, Home Is Where the No-Fault Eviction Is: The Impact of the Drug War on Families in
Public Housing, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 369, 394 (2003) (noting strict liability was employed when a
court allowed an eviction despite the lack of foreseeability for events that violated relevant
requirements); Kelley Elaine Lockman, Note, Who Brought the Kid. United States v. McClain
and the Application of Sentencing Enhancements When Use of a Minor in a Concerted Criminal
Activity Was Foreseeable, 36 GA. L. REV. 863, 893 (2002) (explaining that under the Pinkerton
rule of liability for acts of a co-conspirator, the requirement of foreseeability avoids making it a
rule of strict liability).
82 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 cmt. g (2010) ("Foreseeability often relates to
practical considerations concerning the actor's ability to anticipate future events or to
understand dangerous conditions that already exist. In such cases, what is foreseeable concerns
what the actor 'should have known.'").
8 Singer, supra note 18, at 356.
8 See infra Part IV.
85 Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 401, 430-32 (1993).
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intervening cause of the harm,a such as when the defendant displayed the
required document on his car and it was removed by another in his
absence," or where some malicious criminal has tampered with the end
product on its way to consumers." The proximate causation defense,
however, "has limited use for strict liability crimes. If a defendant is directly
involved in the prohibited action, the defense is unavailable.""
While foreseeability issues can arise in determining proximate
causation, they have traditionally been limited in scope. Proximate causation
is largely the absence of a superseding intervening cause." Not all
intervening causes are superseding causes, and only the latter break the
proximate causation." First, we look to whether the intervening cause is
responsive-in that it was brought on by the defendant's actions-or purely
coincidental.2 If the former, that is generally the end of the inquiry-absent
very unusual circumstances-it is not a superseding cause and the
defendant has proximately caused the end result.2 If it is purely
coincidental, then and only then do we begin to consider foreseeability of
the intervening cause to determine whether it is a superseding cause
relieving the defendant of responsibility for the resulting harm.94 As
discussed in People v. Rideout1
For a defendant's conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the victim's
injury must be a "direct and natural result" of the defendant's actions. In
making this determination, it is necessary to examine whether there was an
intervening cause that superseded the defendant's conduct such that the causal
link between the defendant's conduct and the victim's injury was broken. If an
intervening cause did indeed supersede the defendant's act as a legally
86 See Blaize v. United States, 21 A.3d 78, 81 (D.C. 2011) ("Our cases establish that '[a]n
intervening cause will be considered a superseding legal cause that exonerates the original
actor if it was so unforeseeable that the actor's ... conduct, though still a substantial causative
factor, should not result in the actor's liability.'" (quoting Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407,
418 (D.C. 2003)) (alteration in original)).
87 See KLEbride v Lake [19621 NZLR 590 (SC) 590, 593 (presenting such a quintessential
example that, even though a New Zealand case, it is commonly taught and cited in the United
States and elsewhere).
88 For example, pain relievers have been tampered with on multiple occasions. See, e.g.,
U.S. Dep't of Def., Crisis Communication Strategies: Analysis: Case Study: The Johnson &
Johnson Tyienol Clisis, http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/02C2/
Johnson%20&%20Johnson.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
89 Levenson, supra note 85, at 432.
90 See2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440-441 (1965).
91 See id.
92 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 204-05 (4th ed. 2006)
93 Id. at 204 ("Generally speaking, a responsive intervening cause does not relieve the initial
wrongdoer of criminal responsibility, unless the response was not only unforeseeable, but
highly abnormal or bizarre.").
94 Id. at 206.
95 727 N.W.2d 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), rev'din part 728 N.W.2d 459 (Mich. 2007).
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significant causal factor, then the defendant's conduct will not be deemed a
proximate cause of the victim's injury.6
According to Professor Dressler's treatise, a responsive intervening
cause will typically not relieve the defendant of liability, while a coincidental
intervening cause will typically relieve the defendant of liability unless
foreseeability of the intervention can be established.97 In discussing
responsive intervening causes, Professor Dressler suggests two examples:
first, a boat passenger drowning while attempting to swim to shore after the
boat capsizes, and second, a victim, wounded by a defendant, who dies after
being treated negligently by medical professionals.98 In cases of responsive
intervening causes, the harm at issue comes from actions taken in response
to the defendant's conduct." A coincidental intervening cause, on the other
hand, might be as little as the defendant putting the victim "in the wrong
place at the wrong time," such as if the wounded victim in Professor
Dressler's example above is attacked by a "knife-wielding maniac" while
waiting in the emergency room for treatment.'"
In the end, proximate causation "is a legal construct designed to
prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant's
conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural. Thus, a proximate cause is
simply a factual cause of which the law will take cognizance."'O' Relieving
defendants of liability for lack of proximate causation is thus reserved for
truly special circumstances, in which what has occurred is highly unusual,
not logically related to the defendant's actions, and not likely to occur again
if the defendant continues with the same behavior.
Even where foreseeability does become relevant, it does not necessarily
mean foreseeable to the ordinary person. Given that the trend toward strict
liability offenses has primarily been in the context of public welfare
concerns brought on by the Industrial Revolution,"o2 there must certainly be a
subjective component to the objective question. In other words, while the
ordinary person may not foresee that tightly sealed drums containing toxic
waste might degrade and leach the waste into the ground, a person in the
business of creating or storing such waste should find this foreseeable. If we
were to inject a foreseeable-to-all requirement into public welfare strict
liability offenses, there would be no such thing as strict liability. The entire
point of the existence of public welfare strict liability offenses is that the
defendants are in a special position to prevent a harm that the average
person would know nothing about.
96 Id. at 633 (quoting People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 785 (Mich. 2005)).
97 DRESSLER, supra note 92, at 204, 206.
98 Id. at 204.
99 Id
100 Id. at 205-06.
101 Rideout, 727 N.W.2d at 632 (quoting People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 785 (Mich. 2005))
(internal quotation omitted).
102 See Levenson, supra note 85, at 419; see also Manchester, supra note 27, at 279-80, 282.
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F Strict Liability in the Environmental Context
Although strict liability always requires less culpability than negligence,
regardless of context, it is generally especially strict and fault-free in the
environmental context. Some scholars have suggested that, just as there are
gradations of mens rea, there are also gradations, or at least one split-point,
to strict liability.'03 One example of this is the distinction between "pure" and
"impure" strict liability." As Professor Simons describes it, pure strict
liability requires absolutely no culpability as to any material element of the
offense, whereas impure strict liability requires culpability as to at least one
material element but does not require culpability as to at least one other
element, at least in the sense of some intentional act.1o' The examples he
chose for each are useful. Statutory rape is an example of impure strict
liability, in that one must intentionally engage in sexual intercourse, though
it is not necessary to be aware of-or even negligent as to-the other
participant's age.'00 The example he chose as the quintessential pure strict
liability category of crime was environmental crime, "inasmuch as the
offender need only cause defined forms of environmental risks or harms
(such as exposing the public to certain pollutants or toxins in excess of a
specified level), and it is irrelevant that she lacked negligence, knowledge, or
any other culpability in causing those risks or harms."07
Environmental crime follows in the footsteps of a long line of strict
liability crimes applicable to corporate officers.'08 Generally referred to as
"public welfare offenses," this line of strict liability crimes developed in
response to concerns regarding the dangers brought about by the Industrial
Revolution.'" Progress has a dark side, in that it leads to activities, such as
those directed at harnessing natural resources or those enabling mass
production and distribution of products, that intrude on the natural state of
being and create previously nonexistent dangers. These dangers may be
directly to human beings, or to wildlife, or indirectly to both by harming the
environment we share. These concerns are so great, and the decision to
involve oneself in such enterprises so forward, that strict liability has been
103 A common example is to divide strict liability into public welfare offenses and morality
offenses. See, e.g, Levenson, supra note 85, at 418. Environmental crimes, of course, fall into
the former category. See Andrew J. Turner, Mens Rea in Environmental Crie Prosecutions:
Ignorantia Juris and the Wite Collar Criminal, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 220-21 (1998) (noting
federal appellate courts' treatment of violations under several environmental statutes as
constituting public welfare offenses).
104 Simons, supra note 65, at 1081.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1081-82.
107 Id at 1082.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278, 280-85 (1943) (applying a strict
liability standard to the conviction of a corporate officer for shipping adulterated and
misbranded drugs in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-
399 (2006)).
109 See Levenson, supra note 85, at 419.
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morally and constitutionally accepted in such contexts."o The development
of these strict liability public welfare offenses reflected a "shift of emphasis
from the protection of individual interests" to the "protection of public and
social interests.""' The use of strict liability in these contexts places full
responsibility for dangers-whether known or unknown, foreseen or
unforeseen-in the hands of the only people in a position to prevent
the harm."
Of course, the use of a negligence standard generally shifts
responsibility for risks to those in authority as well, but
[O]nly under strict liability are individuals imprisoned even if they take all
possible precautions to act reasonably. The sole question for the trier of fact is
whether the defendant committed the proscribed act. The jury may not decide
whether the defendant could have done anything else to prevent the unlawful
act."3
One good reason for this method of placing risk responsibility on the
shoulders of those in control of major industrial activities is that it would be
extremely difficult for jurors-or even courts-to properly assess what
should qualify as reasonable care in such complex or extraordinary
circumstances."' Not only might jurors attempting to apply a negligence
standard lead to "inconsistent, unpredictable, and biased" verdicts in these
contexts, but there is also a significant risk that commonly shared views on
appropriate standards of care may vary from one community to the next."5
Strict liability in these contexts also has nearly the same moral force as
a negligence standard would." Underlying the standard is a presumption
that nearly all who are convicted thereby were in fact negligent, but proof of
such negligence is difficult and unreliable."7 To the extent that a few wholly
110 See, ag, Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV.
259, 281-82 (1976); infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
I Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 67 (1933).
112 See Levenson, supra note 85, at 419.
113 Id. at 420 (footnotes omitted).
114 See id. at 421.
115 Mark Kelman, Strict Liabiity: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1512, 1517 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); see also Levenson, supra note 85, at 421.
116 The California Supreme Court stated the need for strict liability offenses as follows:
There are many acts that are so destructive of the social order, or where the ability of the
state to establish the element of criminal intent would be so extremely difficult if not
impossible of proof, that in the interest of justice the legislature has provided that the
doing of the act constitutes a crime, regardless of knowledge or criminal intent on the
part of the defendant.
In these cases it is the duty of the defendant to know what the facts are.
Exparte Marley, 175 P.2d 832, 835 (Cal. 1946) (en banc) (quoting State v. Weisberg, 55 N.E.2d
870, 872 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943)).
117 See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 85, at 421 ("A [] justification often offered for the strict
liability doctrine is that it eases the burden on the prosecution to prove intent in difficult
cases.... As with most irrebuttable presumptions, the legislature believes individual inquiries
are unnecessary because the overwhelming majority of cases will show that the defendant
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innocent defendants are punished, this result is deemed outweighed by the
significant harms such offenses generally are targeted to avoid, also taking
into account the typically light punishments in the balance."' In this sense,
choosing to impose strict liability is a legislature's way of expressing that
this is a danger we take very seriously and wish to avoid at all costs."'
Beware to those who engage in large-scale or otherwise risky activities.
Ultimately, when it comes to public welfare offenses, we are simply
willing to take the risk of punishing some nonnegAgent actors in order to
ensure the greatest possible avoidance of a particularly disconcerting
danger.
The rationale of the doctrine of strict criminal liability is that, although.
criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is
regulation rather than punishment or correction, and that the interest of
enforcement for the public health and safety requires the risk that an
occasional non-offender may be punished in order to prevent the escape of a
greater number of culpable offenders. 2 0
This, of course, is the opposite of the usual philosophy of American criminal
law, that we should allow many guilty people to go free before convicting
even one innocent person, and which philosophy forms the basis for the
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.12 ' But that is what distinguishes
strict criminal liability offenses: they deal with matters so great, and impose
punishment so minimal,' that the balance has been shifted the other way.
acted at least negligently." (footnotes omitted)); Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger,
Presumptions Assumptions, and Due Process in Crminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79
YALE L.J. 165, 173-74 (1969) (discussing the burden of introducing evidence imposed by
presumptions).
118 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (noting that penalties for public
welfare offenses "commonly are relatively small"); see, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of
Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 597, 600-01
(1993) (recognizing that CERCLA's strict liability provisions impose liability on "factually
responsible" parties as a matter of fairness-even where the charged parties are blameless-in
order to deter harmful conduct).
119
By labeling an offense as strict liability, the legislature can claim to provide the utmost
protection from certain public harms. By affording no leniency for defendants causing
harm, the legislature affirms society's interest in being protected from certain conduct.
In this sense, strict liability expresses emphatically that such conduct will not be
tolerated regardless of the actor's intent.
Levenson, supra note 85, at 422.
120 People v. Travers, 124 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
121 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases because, inter alia, "[ilt is critical that the
moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned")
122 This, of course, is debatable given that strict liability has been upheld for felonies with
potential sentences of up to five years-though judicial discretion in sentencing generally
protects nonculpable actors falling prey to strict liability statutes from their full penal force. See
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922) ("[Wlhere one deals with other and his mere negligence may
be dangerous to them .. . the policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require
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It is essential to note that, especially in the critical but not always
universally appreciated area of enviromnental protection, strict criminal
liability may indeed be the only means of getting corporate executives to
take all possible precautions.2 The argument is that, given the corporate
priority of profit maximization, mere corporate fines may simply be rolled
into the cost of doing business, often being well worth the financial benefits
derived from environmental sloppiness, such that corporate officers will not
have adequate incentive to take every possible precaution.'2 4 Thus, exposing
the corporate officers to criminal convictions, and the resulting
punishments, is the only way to achieve complete vigilance.
The quintessential discussion of the philosophy and moral justification
for strict criminal liability is found in Morissette v. United States.12" The
moral support for the strict liability standard comes from its development in
relation to public welfare offenses-out of concern for the dangers created
by the many new trades that sprung from the Industrial Revolution:
Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or
invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of
neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many
violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person
or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law
seeks to minimize... .Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a
matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused,
if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no
more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it
might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities."
For this reason the Court held that, while it supported strict criminal
liability in this regulatory context, it would not apply it to traditional
common law crimes based on moral culpability-larceny, in that case.'
Environmental crimes are the direct descendants of the original
development of regulatory public welfare offenses. Environmental harm is
generally caused, whether knowingly or not, by those who are "in a position
to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no
the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant "); see also Phillip E.
Johnson, Strict Liability The Prevalent View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, Supra
note 115, at 1518, 1520 (suggesting judges use discretion in sentencing by noting that "the
criminal penalties provided in these [strict liability] statutes are rarely imposed," and providing
an example of a reduced sentence). That said, the MBTA, which is the subject of this Article,
already abolished strict liability for its felonies, leaving only strict liability misdemeanors. See
supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
123 See, e.g., Steven Zipperman, The Park Doctrine-Application of Strict Ciminal LiabiLity
to Corporate Individuals for Violation of Environmental Crimes, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
123, 123 (1991) (suggesting that criminal sanctions are one way to curtail corporate unlawful
disposal of hazardous waste).
124 See id. at 167.
125 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
126 Id. at 253-56.
127 Id at 260, 262.
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more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his
responsibilities."l28
IV. THE LATEST APPELLATE CASE TO ADDRESS MBTA LIABILITY
The Supreme Court has yet to address the standard for criminal liability
under the MBTA. Indeed, a Westlaw search reveals that the Court has only
so much as mentioned the statute a handful of times. Thus, advocates have
been forced to develop the area in lower courts, mostly at the trial court
level. Of the handful of appellate cases discussing the application of the
strict liability standard under the MBTA, only two deal with the most
essential modem area of enforcement: an industrial setting resulting in
indirect harn-as opposed to the hunting context, which is not the focus of
this Article. The first is United States v FMC Corp.,"' a well-known case for
upholding strict liability under the MBTA as against a defendant who was
not aware of the "lethal-to-birds quality" of his runoff ponds.'30 The FMC
Court handled the issue of the MBTA's theoretically broad reach by
entrusting it to disciplined use of prosecutorial discretion. 1 While this case
has been highly regarded and often cited-after all, until last year it was the
only appellate case on the matter-it is also well over three decades old, and
now we have a new appellate case to reckon with in this context. As the only
appellate case since FMCto address the application of strict MBTA liability
to industrial actors, or even to indirect harm in general, this latest case out
of the Tenth Circuit requires some attention.
United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.'32 involved two defendants, Apollo
and Walker, both owners of oil drilling operations.tn These operations used
numerous heater-treaters, devices with exhaust pipes that frequently entrap
birds absent a simple protective screen, which was lacking in both
defendants' heater-treaters.'" After finding several hundred dead birds
trapped in heater-treaters in the region-southeast Kansas-the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) engaged in a public awareness campaign in the
area regarding the heater-treater problem, sending letters to individual oil
companies in the area, including Apollo, but not Walker.1" The campaign
included posters, industry presentations, TV news stories, and an Associated
Press story."' As a matter of prosecutorial discretion, FWS chose not to
recommend prosecution for the MBTA violations pre-dating the campaign-
for the dead birds that prompted the campaign.'
128 Id. at 256 (discussing public welfare offenses generally).
129 572 F. Supp. 2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
130 Id. at 903, 908.
131 Id at 905.
132 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
133 Id at 682.
I3 Id. at 682, 685, 691 (noting both Apollo and Walker -failed to bird-proof their
heater-treaters).
135 Id at 682, 683 & n.2.
136 Id at 683.
137 Id
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Apollo's violation took place after it was directly notified of the issue by
FWS during its campaign.'m Walker's violations both took place after the
informational campaign, but he did not receive a direct FWS letter until after
his first violation-after which he still did nothing to screen his heater-
treaters; the second violation was a year after the first and its corresponding
letter.'" The lower court convicted on all counts, based on the applicable
strict liability standard, as the unscreened heater-treaters were within the
defendants' control.o The Tenth Circuit upheld strict liability as the
standard for liability, but held that strict liability only satisfies due process if
the defendants proximately caused the proscribed harm."' The convictions
for both Apollo and Walker for the violations that took place after receipt of
the letter were affirmed, but Walker's conviction for the violation that took
place well after the campaign but before his own letter-which was
prompted by this violation-was reversed for lack of proximate causation."'
In spite of the court's stated approval of strict liability for MBTA
misdemeanors, Walker's testimony that he did not know about the heater-
treater problem prior to his first violation 3 was the basis for the court's
reversal of that count.'4 The district court had found proximate causation to
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because trapped birds were a direct
consequence of failing to screen the access holes to the heater-treater.145 The
defendant's lack of knowledge was not part of the equation in the lower
court, as it was applying a strict liability standard.'"6
The Tenth Circuit, however, based its determination of whether the
defendants proximately caused the bird deaths on "what knowledge the
defendants had or should have had of birds potentially dying in their heater-
treaters.""' This language evokes a "knew or should have known" standard,
138 Id.
139 Id. at 682, 683 & n.2, 685, 691 (noting that Walker had been urged by the FWS to secure
his heater-treaters, but had failed to do so).
140 See id. at 682.
141 Id
142 Id at 691.
143 Id This is a somewhat dubious allegation, given that a full year after the first violation
and corresponding FWS letter he still had not fixed the problem and had another violation for
another bird death. Id at 683 & n.2. I see no reason to believe that the first violation, about six
months after the huge campaign, would have been prevented had he only heard of the
campaign. If he is not going to act on a warning directed to him personally, he certainly will not
do so in response to a news campaign. I doubt he missed it, as it targeted industry members and
their equipment suppliers. Id. at 682-83. That said, for the sake of this analysis, I will assume the
facts are as he says, both to view the facts in a light most favorable to him-I would not argue
with the factual findings of the lower court-and because his lack of knowledge should not
relieve his guilt under a strict liability analysis anyway-as it did not in the lower court.
14 Id. at 691.
145 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., Nos. 08-10111-KMH, 2008 WL 4369300, at *7, *9 n.16
(D. Kan. Sept. 23, 2008), affd, No. 08-10111-01-JTM, 2009 WL 211580 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2009), affd
in part, 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
146 See id at *78.
147 Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 690 n.5.
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which is not appropriate in a strict liability context."' If such knowledge-
that a defendant had or should have had-were required, the standard would
be one of at least negligence. To make matters worse, the lower court made
findings of fact that "birds trapped in heater/treaters [were] relatively
common in the industry," and that "oil operators have been aware for some
time that bird remains are frequently found in heater/treaters.""' The Tenth
Circuit simply disagreed with the lower court on these findings of fact.'"
Given that dead birds were found in both defendants' heater-treaters on
every FWS inspection,' it is hard to believe that the concept of bird
attraction to these devices was entirely new to them. Nevertheless, in the
context of strict liability public welfare offenses, the fact that the bird deaths
were common should not have mattered. Where the commonality of the
problem is relevant, however, is in the sense that it completely rules out the
notion that it was such an absurd result as to wipe out proximate
causation.5 1 Indeed, there was not even any intervening cause at all,
neither responsive nor coincidental-the defendants' actions directly caused
the harm.
The Apollo Energies court apparently derived its foreseeability analysis,
requiring knowledge of the dangers posed by heater-treaters, from the due
process concept of "notice" requirements."' It placed great focus on Lambert
v. California,' in which the Supreme Court held that due process required
notice "where a person, wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing,"
fails to affirmatively act as the law requires, and is criminally liable for that
failure.'? Lambert involved a requirement to register as a felon if present in
the state, where such presence was not an activity likely to trigger an
expectation of regulation absent notice, which the Supreme Court expressly
distinguished from other public welfare offenses where people are involved
148 See United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the standard
for a different statute and rejecting both proffered extremes-one being actual knowledge and
the other being strict liability-in favor of a compromise of "should have known").
149 Apollo Energies, 2008 WL 4369300, at *7, *9 n. 15.
150 Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 691.
151 Id. at 682-83
152 See id at 690 ("[Plroximate causation 'normally eliminates the bizarre
(quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
153 The court stated:
Questions abound regarding what types of predicate acts-acts which lead to the
MBTA's specifically prohibited acts-can constitute a crime. Conceptually, the
constitutional challenge to the criminalization of these predicate acts can be placed
under the rubric of notice or causation. The inquiries regarding whether a defendant
was on notice that an innocuous predicate act would lead to a crime, and whether a
defendant caused a crime in a legally meaningful sense, are analytically indistinct,
and go to the heart of due process constraints on criminal statutes.
Id. at 689; see also id at 691.
154 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
155 Id at 228.
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in potentially harmful activities. The Apollo Energies court analogized the
need for notice in Lambert to the FWS notice of the heater-treater problem,
such that only those who had received the FWS letters had adequate notice
to support due process, which the court called an indistinguishable issue
from that of proximate causation.17
This MBTA case bears absolutely no resemblance to Lambert. One
cannot credibly define the operation of an oil rig as "wholly passive."a As
discussed in Part III.D, the Supreme Court has held that in the context of
activities that a reasonable person would expect might be regulated, such as
those with the potential to cause harm, strict criminal liability is
constitutional. 9 The Court has spoken clearly regarding the importance of
activities one might expect to be regulated, but has said nothing about the
ability to predict the specific factual harm-as this suggests a "knew or
should have known" standard and would not be strict liability. In a time and
place where there are numerous environmental restrictions on industrial
activities, in place for nearly four decades'e at the times relevant to Apollo
Energies, there can be no doubt that a reasonable person would expect
regulation of the activity of operating an oil rig. To describe such a party as
"wholly passive" and without notice of the potential for regulation offends
156 Id. at 226-29 (finding that violation of the registration ordinance, which simply involved
being present in the city, was unlike other crimes whose acts would put one on notice for
potential consequences).
157 Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 689, 691.
158 The lower court addressed this point head-on, although the Tenth Circuit ignored its
comments:
[T]he court is not persuaded that defendants were "passive." Defendants both owned and
operated unshielded oil production equipment that trapped birds. Defendants were not
"passive," standing quietly on the sidelines. They both actively operated equipment for
the production of oil. Accordingly, the court rejects defendants' argument that they
engaged in no affirmative acts or negligence and that they were merely passive actors.
Apollo Energies, 2008 WL 4369300, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 23, 2008).
159 See International Minera, 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971) ("[W]here ... dangerous or
deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of
regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."); supra Part HI.D.
160 For example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) alone imposes numerous restrictions upon both
persons and industries in their use of United States waters. See Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). For example, it is illegal under the CWA "for any owner or
operator of any new source {of pollution] to operate ... in violation of any Iapplicable) standard
of performance" once promulgated by the Administrator. Id. § 1316(e). Additionally, the CWA
spells out several categories of sources of pollution, such as paper and pulp mills, meat
processing plants, and petroleum refining facilities, and authorizes the Administrator to revise
the list of such sources from time to time. Id. § 1316(b)(1)(A), (B). Further, the CWA specifically
authorizes the Administrator to "propose and publish regulations establishing Federal standards
of performance for new sources" of pollution amongst those types listed in section
1316(b)(1)(A). Id. § 1316(b)(1)(B). In addition to the CWA and other environmental restrictions
on industrial activities, the MBTA has been in place for nearly a century. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712
(2006) (indicating that the MBTA was codified in 1918).
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reason."' Lambert lacked actus reus, but in the environmental context, the
actus reus is the operation of the plant that causes the harm.' 2 A
requirement that the operator knows of the specific harm itself would be
about mens rea, and thus would go beyond the mere actus reus requirement
of a strict liability offense."3
The Apollo Energies court took the expectation that parties be on
notice of the potential for regulation of their activities and twisted it into a
requirement that the government provide individualized written notice of
each particular risk of harm in order to hold the parties responsible for that
harm." In unprecedented fashion, the court suggests the government must
track down every potential violator, in advance of their violation, and then
affirmatively and individually warn them not to commit the violation-a
requirement that would be impossible for agencies to meet.
This approach also counters decades of preceding cases. In addition to
those already discussed above,'" in the 1990s three district court cases found
mine operators strictly'liable under the MBTA for the deaths of migratory
birds that were drawn to ponds of water laced with cyanide as a result of the
leaching processes involved in mining for precious metals.'" In these cases
the miners had no idea these ponds were attracting and killing migratory
birds, but much like Apollo's and Walker's heater-treaters (at least as the
lower court held), they were responsible for the dangerous-to-birds
attraction whether they knew birds were drawn to it or not. Around the
same time, Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company were held
strictly criminally liable for migratory bird deaths that resulted from an
accidental oil spill that followed a shipping disaster."'
Arguably the most similar case to Apollo Energies is United States v.
Moon Lake Electnc Ass'n (Moon Lake)."8 Moon Lake involved migratory
161 See, eg., International klinerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65 (highlighting the fact that there is a
presumption of awareness of regulation on the part of parties who are in possession of, or are
dealing with, dangerous substances or waste materials). It is worth noting here that Apollo
Energies was decided on June 30, 2010, just over two months after the horrific and infamous BP
PLC (formerly British Petroleum) oil rig explosion and resulting long-term spill. Apollo
Energies, 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010); Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The DEEPWATER HORIZON
Disaster-Some Liabity Issues, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 125, 126-27 (2010) (noting that the release of
oil into the gulf from the Deep water Horizon's ruptured well began on April 20, 2010, and lasted
for 87 days). Indeed, that spill was still ongoing at the time of the opinion. Id. To suggest that
operators of oil rigs are not parties on notice of the potential for regulation is absurd.
162 See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that an
individual's possession or control of dangerous substances like asbestos puts those persons "on
notice that criminal statutes probably regulate the handling and release of the substances" due
to their very nature as hazardous materials).
163 See, e.g, id
164 See Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 691.
165 See discussion supra Part IV.F; supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
166 See Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned- Criminal
Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 359,
388-89 & n.22 (1999).
167 Id. at 389; Stephen Raucher, Comment, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters:
The Exxon Valdez Crirninal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 148, 164 (1992).
168 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
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bird deaths resulting from electrocution by the defendant's electric power
poles.'" Just as birds had always been drawn to heater-treaters and then
trapped inside, birds had historically died from such pole and power line
electrocutions.70 Likewise, just as the heater-treater problem was easily
resolved with screens, the electric poles could have been rendered safer via
the installation of inexpensive equipment. 7 1 It was the failure to install such
equipment that resulted in the defendant's charges in both Moon Lake and
the lower court in Apollo Energies. The Moon Lake court based its analysis
for finding proximate cause on differentiating the defendant's activities from
those that everyday ordinary individuals engage in, which may at some point
result in the death of a migratory bird."' The special operations involved had
a probable consequence of resulting in bird deaths.'7' Ultimately, the Tenth
Circuit opinion in Apollo Energies does not merely reverse the holding
below, it runs counter to nearly all lower court opinions on this issue to
date, as well as the only prior appellate opinion on the topic."
Another line of cases, decided before the MBTA was amended to
require mens rea, applied strict liability for the offense of hunting over bait;
these cases nearly unanimously held that hunters did not have to know an
area was baited to be held criminally liable."' Applying the reasoning of
Apollo Energies to these cases would limit criminal liability to those who
had been directly warned that an area was baited, a limitation no court
previously required. One case that applied a "knew or should have known
standard,"'76 was widely criticized'77 and was later indirectly overruled.' Of
course, as a result of legislative amendment, "knew or should have known"
is now the standard the MBTA expressly applies to hunting over bait.
169 Id. at 1071-72.
170 See id at 1086.
171 Id. at 1071.
172 Id. at 1085.
173 See id, at 1085, 1088.
174 See Arensberg, supra note 74, at 430-31, 438-40, 442, 444 (discussing how Apollo
Energies' holding "raises the bar of strict liability" with the new requirement of a proximate
cause analysis); Collette L. Adkins Giese, Spreading Its Wings: Using the Miratory Bird Treaty
Act to Protect Habitat, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1157, 1174 (2010) (asserting that only a few
courts have analyzed causal liability in MBTA cases); supra notes 129-31 and accompanying
text (discussing FMC, the appellate decision).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that "a
hunter is strictly liable for shooting on or over a baited area"); United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d
955, 958 (6th Cir. 1983) ("ISIcienter is not an element of an offense under the regulation.");
United States v. Atkinson, 468 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D. Wis. 1979) ("[T]he regulation is
constitutional despite its lack of an intent requirement.").
176 United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1978).
177 United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Boynton, 63
F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984).
178 See United States v. Lee, 217 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2000) (Politz, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the majority had abandoned the "guiding principle" of Delahoussaye by not implementing
the "'should have known' form of scienter" as "a necessary element of the offense of hunting
over a baited field").
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Appellate courts that have previously addressed the constitutionality of
the MBTA's strict liability provision have held that it does not offend the
requirements of due process.'" As the Seventh Circuit noted:
The late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once pointed out the distinction
between criminal and non-criminal intent: "Even a dog distinguishes between
being stumbled over and being kicked." In strict liability cases, like this one,
both stumbling over and kicking a dog result in criminal liability."
The point is clear: strict liability is liability without fault.
If the MBTA is to maintain its strict liability standard as it continues its
progression into the world of environmental restrictions on industrial
behavior, the reasoning of Apollo Energies simply cannot be accepted. Its
current status as the latest and nearly exclusive appellate position on the
issue renders it particularly dangerous. At some point the Supreme Court
will need to weigh in on this issue. In the meantime, some proposals are
offered in the next Part for restructuring our regulatory and enforcement
scheme to create a morally defensible master plan. Not all courts are willing
to place their trust in prosecutorial discretion where a statute has such
sweeping potential to criminalize everyday living-having windows, non-
negligent driving of a motor vehicle, etc.'"'-so prosecutorial policy must be
expressed clearly in advance.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MBTA's ENFORCEMENT FUTURE
It has been posited that "[t]he MBTA in many ways acts as a skeleton
upon which the implementing regulations necessarily place the flesh."'a The
MBTA completely outlaws taking, killing, or possessing migratory birds "at
any time, by any means or in any manner,"a3 applying strict criminal liability
for misdemeanor violations,'4 but then states that the Secretary of the
Interior is:
179 United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d
431, 435 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[Ilt is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge."); Catlett 747 F.2d at 1104-
05 (noting that scienter is not required for a conviction pursuant to MBTA); United States v.
Ireland, 493 F.2d 1208, 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting that scienter is not required for a conviction
pursuant to MBTA).
180 Smith, 29 F.3d at 273 n.1 (citation omitted) (internal quote originates from OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 3 (32nd prtg. 1938)).
181 See, e.g, United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 743-45 (D. Idaho 1989) ("[A]
homeowner could be pursued under the MBTA if a flock of geese crashed into his plate-glass
window and were killed. An airplane pilot could be prosecuted if geese were sucked into his jet
engines. . . . These examples make one queasy about the reach of strict liability
criminal statutes.").
182 Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 166, at 370.
183 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
184 See id § 707(a).
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[Aluthorized and directed ... to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and
by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow
hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment,
transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg
thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing the same.""
In other words, Congress made a sweeping prohibition that would be
unrealistic to enforce-a prohibition that could, at some point, touch nearly
everyone's activities-and then asked the Secretary to carve out an
enforceable plan.
If the government hopes to escape the inappropriate and impractical
limitation on strict liability imposed by Apollo Energies, it must develop
limiting regulations or written enforcement policies that address the
concerns courts have regarding the potential over-inclusiveness of the
MBTA. By properly limiting its reach and protecting truly passive or ordinary
individuals expressly, and not just with its own case-by-case prosecutorial
discretion, the government-the Departments of the Interior and Justice-
can prevent the kind of bad law created by Apollo Energies. Such an express
policy might even obtain a supportive constitutional or interpretive holding
in the highest court, should it take on the matter.
Even the FMC court, which upheld the application of strict liability to
corporate actors in the industrial context, expressed some reservations:
Certainly construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such as
deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modem office buildings or
picture windows in residential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend
reason and common sense.... Such situations properly can be left to the
sound discretion of prosecutors and the courts.
This makes sense in relation to the due process justification for applying
strict liability at all: the defendant is engaged in an activity that he might
reasonably expect to be regulated in some way. He need not know
precisely howhis actions are regulated-ignorance of the law is no defense.
Nor must he know of the facts that result in a violation of the law-as this
would be a mens rea requirement, which is absent under strict liability. To
incur liability, a defendant must simply know that he is engaged in a sort
of activity-over which he has authority-that the government may wish
to regulate.
My question is this: why limit our effort to focus MBTA application on
such individuals to case-by-case prosecutorial discretion? Doing so risks
generating opinions, like Apollo Energies, which create broadly applicable
bad law in either an effort to disagree with the prosecutorial choice in that
instance, or perhaps out of general distrust of prosecutorial discretion in the
context of an unbridled criminal statute such as the MBTA. The prosecution
has no face-saving regulation to point to, or even a fair and comprehensive
185 Id. § 704(a).
186 FMC 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978).
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written prosecutorial policy. Providing some structure, where there
currently is little, may well save the day.
We need limiting regulations that restrict the scope of MBTA
prosecution to those engaged in industrial and commercial activity and
those otherwise engaged in unusually hazardous-even if noncommercial-
activities. This could then be bolstered by a prosecutorial policy that
interprets the regulations to sufficiently limit the scope of potential
defendants to those engaged in activities one might expect to be regulated,
thus rendering a pure strict liability approach-without further
foreseeability requirements-appropriate. Indeed, even if the Department of
the Interior did only the latter, it could go a long way in achieving the goals I
suggest, which are as follows:
1. Provide a uniform system to determine which cases to prosecute
within the government's otherwise extremely broad authority;
2. Ensure clear communication of these prosecutorial priorities
between the Departments of the Interior and Justice;
3. Create a written interpretation of the statute that saves it from
potential constitutional weaknesses;
4. Assure the courts that the government is cognizant of due process
concerns inherent in the Act's potential reach, perhaps preventing
judges from feeling the need to carve out these limits via court
opinions; and
5. Place industrial actors and others involved in potentially hazardous-
to-birds activities on notice that they are the prosecutorial targets
of the Act, rendering it more likely that they will engage in the
necessary due diligence to avoid a violation in the first place.
If the Department of the Interior chooses to accomplish this task via
regulation, it would be advantageous to frame it as an interpretation of the
intended reach of the statute. There are two reasons for this. First, such an
interpretation, in the context of rulemaking, would be entitled to Chevron
deference if challenged."" Second, to the extent that Congress delegated the
policy question of the criminal reach of the statute,'m a party who disagrees
with the policies expressed in the regulations may attempt a nondelegation
challenge. That said, even without expressing the regulatory choices as
statutory interpretation, such a challenge would be weak; nondelegation
challenges rarely succeed.. and issues with MBTA's reach are arguably more
about prosecutorial discretion than legislative policy. An additional upside
187 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984)
(recognizing a long history of judicial deference to reasonable administrative interpretations of
the meaning or reach of statutes that agencies administer).
188 See supra text accompanying note 185.
189 See Randolph J. May, The Publc Interest Standard Is It Too Indeterminate to Be
Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 438 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court has not
explicitly used the nondelegation doctrine as grounds to invalidate a statute since 1935 and that
lower federal courts have only rarely invoked the doctrine).
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to addressing this issue via notice and comment regulations is that the
administrative discussion process will ensure wider dissemination of the
new policies than would be likely via written policy alone.
Should FWS choose not to address this issue through regulatory
drafting and the corresponding full notice and comment rulemaking process,
most of the goals I have listed can be accomplished-arguably all of them,
albeit to a slightly diminished extent-via a written policy statement.
Despite the fact that a policy statement would be entitled to a lower level of
deference if challenged, I believe that a court would uphold the policies I
propose as consistent with existing Supreme Court interpretations of the
due process limits on strict liability in the environmental public welfare
offense context. A discussion of this case law should be included in the
written policy and presented as the basis for it. I would also recommend that
the policy be drafted and issued jointly by the Department of the Interior-
FWS-and the Department of Justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given that the due process concerns associated with strict criminal
liability are alleviated in the context of predictably regulated activities, and
that such activities result in most of the MBTA violations of concern for
prosecution, it is time for the Department of the Interior to express its target
more clearly in regulations or a written policy. Such a self-imposed
limitation would help prevent overreaching limitations imposed by
misguided court decisions, which can be quite damaging. Not only would
such a policy have left room for the prosecutions in Apollo Energies, but it
may have prevented the resulting reversal and corresponding bad law that
could impact many prosecutions to come.
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